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A POLICY LEADERSHIP COMMISSION FOR
NAFTA
Ronald D. Knutson and R.M.A. Loyns
If there are to be positive and progressive next steps in the
NAFTA process, there must be a Secretariat that is continu-
ously pushing and monitoring progress. This Secretariat
must have ways of concretely measuring progress—scor-
ing the gains and losses. Economists have an important
role to play in developing this scoring process. Such a Sec-
retariat could have a series of special working groups to
provide advice, facilitate dialog, and ease the transition.
(Knutson and Ochoa, February 2001).
INTRODUCTION
The above conclusion, reached in discussions at the Seventh Agri-
cultural and Food Policy Information Workshop, forms the basis for this
paper. The idea of a Secretariat arose from the frustration and realization
that the root causes of the conflicts that have developed under NAFTA are
not being addressed in a manner that takes policy to the next level of
harmonization.
Throughout the previous seven workshops, the contributions of
NAFTA have been identified and analyzed. In general terms, trading rela-431
tions, terms of trade, and trade itself have all benefitted as a consequence
of the arrangements first negotiated between the United States and Canada
in 1989, and later by signing the agreements known as NAFTA in 1995.
However, these workshops have also determined that the agreements, the
processes they established for resolving disputes and, particularly, for
moving forward in the achievement of freer trade indicate that much work
remains to be done. Terms of trade in selected areas, differential subsidiza-
tion (particularly in the crops area), data availability and analysis, market
structure evolution and competition, and increasing incidence of trade dis-
putes indicate that the present process of NAFTA has significant weak
links.
Our purpose is to expand on the NAFTA Secretariat idea, to dis-
cuss the roles it might play, how it might operate, the problems it might
solve, and the issues it would raise. This paper accepts the conclusion and
charge of the Seventh Workshop to finish a task initiated by Knutson,
Loyns, and Ochoa (2002) that compared and discussed policy and pro-
gram compatibility across agriculture in the three NAFTA countries. In
that paper, and in the general discussion that followed, there were a num-
ber of issues identified which led to the group conclusion that there is a
need for a leadership body or agency within NAFTA with authority to
become a focal point for dispute settlement; to provide data, analysis, and
policy planning; and to exercise leadership that is reflective of NAFTA
objectives. No such institution was built into NAFTA. The rubric used for
this NAFTA Secretariat is the Policy Leadership Commission (PLC). What
we hope to come from this paper and the discussion that follows is an
articulation of the needs and role for a PLC as another contribution of the
Policy Disputes Information Consortium exercise.
Illustrative of the institutional framework  that impedes NAFTA
performance are trade disputes that are dominated by domestic trade rem-
edy laws (TRLs). The comments of Françoy Raynauld earlier in this pub-
lication indicate that the role of the NAFTA Secretariats in each country is
not proactive and is limited to trade dispute referrals after the relevant
TRLs have taken their course.
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PREVIOUS WORKSHOPS
It is not possible to cover all of the instances identified in previous
workshops where authoritative leadership is was needed to move NAFTA
forward in the achievement of freer trade. The following, however, reflect
some of the We offer six major conclusions that clearly indicate this need:
• The overwhelming issue coming from the workshops is the in-
crease in frequency and the cost of full-blown trade disputes
among the NAFTA partners. These disputes are most frequently
administered outside the NAFTA in the sense that they are
brought and processed under domestic TRLs.
• A serious NAFTA flaw is that individual countries can pursue
their domestic subsidies without consideration of the effects on
other countries. The ultimate irony is that these subsidies are con-
tributing factors to TRL actions that also undermine NAFTA. The
result is significant trade distortions in major field crops with
spin-off effects on the livestock, dairy, and poultry sectors be-
cause of the feed grain connection.
Fulton and Furtan (2000) argue that harmonization means equivalent lev-
els of support to producers in all three countries irrespective of the particu-
lar programs, determined jointly by periodic consultation.
• Closely related to the second point there is a need for analyses,
proposals and leadership for integrating the excluded commodi-
ties from the original agreements into the NAFTA framework
which includes tobacco, sugar, dairy, poultry, wheat and barley.
These excluded commodities are serious constraints on progress toward
harmonizing trade among the three partners and on reducing trade and
resource distortions.
• There is a lack of analysis of the distributional consequences of
trade agreements.433
As a result, charges and countercharges are not properly sorted out in the
arena of objective research and education. This lack of information is a
contributor to misconceptions about the impacts of NAFTA and thereby
contributes to policy and trade stress. These workshops were conceived to
contribute to objective analysis and information flows, but we are a drop
in a veritable sea of charges, countercharges and misinformation.
• Data and analyses are scarce regarding the evolution of market
structures and competition as business and trading relations re-
act to more open trading conditions.
The papers on structure and competition in the Sixth Workshop (2002
publication) were far from definitive in their conclusions, but they cer-
tainly pointed to data problems, the need for more analysis and most im-
portantly, to the inability of competition/antitrust policies in their present
form to deal with evolving structure and competition issues.
• On the positive side, Knutson, Loyns, and Ochoa (2002) identi-
fied a number of opportunities for increased harmony and freer
trade among the NAFTA partners that should not encounter seri-
ous conflict.
These opportunities include leveling the playing field in education, exten-
sion, research, economic information, grading systems, plant and animal
protection, environmental regulation, disaster assistance, agricultural credit,
food programs, and infrastructure. Taking advantage of these opportuni-
ties requires the initiative of a leadership body and varying degrees of cost
sharing. In the case of Mexico, they are keys to encouraging capital invest-
ments by the agribusiness community, which, in turn, creates job opportu-
nities for the rural poor and reduces pressures for immigration.
FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICY LEADERSHIP COMMISSION
What follows is designed to be a starting point for a discussion of
the functions that the PLC might perform. In a sense, it is a wish list based
on the experience of the authors in the agriculture and agri-food indus-
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tries. This list does not consider the needs of other industries covered by
NAFTA, although it is recognized that they may have comparable as well
as unique needs. With these constraints in mind, we propose for consider-
ation the following four PLC functions.
Data and Analysis.  The PLC would be a clearing-house for in-
formation, data, analysis, and performance assessment. The output from
this function would feed into other PLC functions such as policy planning
and provide an objective source of information for mediation/
dispute settlement processes. In carrying out this function, The PLC would
procure, compile and manage a database; manage, and distribute primary
and secondary data on NAFTA issues; and be a clearing-house for re-
search and information related to NAFTA operation.
Dispute Settlement.  The PLC would be the first referral for dis-
pute settlements instead of the appeal process from TRL decisions as now
exists. Its powers would include analysis, negotiation, mediation and dis-
pute settlement recommendations, all under carefully prepared guidelines
that are designed to promote the objectives of NAFTA that reflect reason-
able business and economic protocols, and that reduce the current state of
trade dispute idiocy. Consideration should be given to prohibiting TRL
actions within NAFTA. If this function is unacceptable because of sover-
eignty considerations, the PLC should have safeguards and penalties to
protect against groundless interest group actions.
Planning and Evaluation.  The PLC would conduct policy/pro-
gram assessments and performance analyses related to NAFTA operations,
its successes, and its limitations. The PLC would have policy planning
capabilities and the authority to pursue needed initiatives within NAFTA
and by the member countries to achieve harmonization. The PLC would
provide proposals for the next steps in NAFTA development as well as for
expansion considerations such as a Free Trade Agreement of the Ameri-
cas.
Competition policy.  The PLC would include a competition unit
to assemble and to distribute structure/conduct data and information. This435
unit would serve as a co-ordinator of country-competition/antitrust activi-
ties in matters related to NAFTA competition issues and would advise on
policy development on competition issues.
In general, the PLC would be the catalyst for change within NAFTA
and by its member countries to achieve freer trade. It would be an active
contributor to the process of dispute settlement. It would be an open source
of information on NAFTA and its progress. In this way, the PLC would
contribute to overall improvement of public understanding of the role and
contribution of NAFTA in a North American context.
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